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Abstract In one aspect of our life or another, today we all live with AI. For example,
the mechanisms behind the search engines operating on the Internet do not just
retrieve information, but also constantly learn how to respond more rapidly and
usefully to our requests. Although framed by its human inventors, this AI is getting
stronger and more powerful every day to go beyond the original human intentions
in the future. One of the major questions emerging along with the propagation of AI
in both technology and life is about safety in AI. This paper presents the author’s
view about how formal methods can assist us in building safer and reliable AI.
1 Introduction
AI depends on our ability to efficiently transfer knowledge to software-intensive
systems. A computerized machine can be considered as one exhibiting AI when it
has the basic capabilities to transfer data into context-relevant information and then
that information into conclusions exhibiting knowledge. Going further, we can say
that AI is only possible in the presence of artificial awareness [12], one by which
we can transfer knowledge to machines. Artificial awareness entails much more
than computerized knowledge, however. It must also incorporate means by which
a computerized machine can perceive events and gather data about its external and
internal worlds. Therefore, to exhibit awareness, intelligent systems must sense and
analyze components as well as the environment in which they operate. Determin-
ing the state of each component and its status relative to performance standards, or
service-level objectives, is therefore vital for an aware system. Such systems should
be able to notice changes, understand their implications, and apply both pattern
analysis and pattern recognition to determine normal and abnormal states. In other
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words, awareness is conceptually a product of representing, processing, and moni-
toring knowledge. Therefore, AI requires knowledge representation, which can be
considered as a formal specification of the “brain” of an AI system. Moreover, to
allow for learning, we must consider an open-world model of this “machine brain”.
2 Artificial Intelligence and Safety
But, how to build safe AI systems? With regard to system safety, there seem to be at
least two “cultures” among the AI scientists. One culture emphasizes the limitations
of systems that are amenable to formal methods (e.g., machine learning techniques),
and advises that developers use traditional software development methods to build
a functional system, and try to make it safe near the end of the process. The other
culture mainly involves people working on safety-critical systems and it tends to
think that getting strong safety guarantees is generally only possible when a system
is designed “from the ground up” with safety in mind.
I believe, both research “cultures” have their niche within AI. Both cultures lean
towards the use of open-world modeling of the AI by using formal methods. The
difference lies mainly in the importance of the safety requirements, which justifies
both approaches. Note that AI is a sort of superior control mechanism that exclu-
sively relies on the functionality of the system to both detect safety hazards and
pursue safety procedures. Therefore, in all cases AI is limited by system functional-
ity and systems designed “from the ground up with safety in mind” are presumably
designed with explicit safety-related functionality, and thus, their AI is less limited
when it comes to safety.
For many NASA and ESA systems [17], safety is an especially important source
of requirements. Requirements engineers can express safety requirements as a set of
features and procedures that ensure predictable system performance under normal
and abnormal conditions. Furthermore, AI engineers might rely on safety require-
ments to derive special self-* objectives controlling the consequences of unplanned
events or accidents [13, 14]. You can think about the self-* objectives as AI ob-
jectives driving the system in critical situations employing self-adaptive behavior.
Safety standards might be a good source of safety requirements and consecutively
on safety-related self-* objectives. Such self-* objectives may provide for fault-
tolerance behavior, bounding failure probability, and adhering to proven practices
and standards. Explicit safety requirements provide a key way to maintain safety-
related knowledge within a machine brain of what is important for safety. In typical
practice, safety-related AI requirements can be derived by a four-stage process [14]:
1. Hazard identification – all the hazards exhibited by the system are identified. A
hazard might be regarded as a condition - situation, event, etc., that may lead to
an accident.
2. Hazard analysis – possible causes of the system’s hazards are explored and
recorded. Essentially, this step identifies all processes, combinations of events,
and sequences that can lead from a “normal” or “safe” state to an accident.
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Success in this step means that we now understand how the system can get to
an accident.
3. Identifying safety capabilities – a key step is to identify the capabilities (func-
tionality) the system needs to have in order to perform its goals and remain safe.
It is very likely that some of the capabilities have been already identified by for
the purpose of other self-* objectives.
4. Requirements derivation – once the set of hazards is known, and their causation
is understood, engineers can derive safety requirements that either prevent the
hazards occurring or mitigate the resulting accidents via self-* objectives.
3 AI and Technological Singularity
But what will happen when the AI is programmed to self-adapt its hazard iden-
tification capabilities to improve the same or to identify new hazards that are not
originally planned to be tackled. Well, we will most probably get to the next level
of AI where it evolves and goes beyond its original meaning. This situation can
be addressed as technological singularity [18]. Note that the term singularity has
been used in math to describe an asymptote-like situation where normal rules no
longer apply. For example, an originally programmed AI can stop detecting specific
hazards, just because its evaluation criteria has evolved, and these hazards are not
hazards anymore. From this point forward, we will be not tat far from the moment
in the future when our technology’s intelligence exceeds our own.
Such AI will be both powerful and dangerous. Why dangerous? The answer lays
in the eventual damage - direct or indirect, that can be caused by overlooked hazards
or misinterpreted human intentions. For example, your email spam filter can be
loaded with intelligence about how to figure out what is spam and what is not and
it will start to learn and tailor its intelligence to you as it gets experience with your
particular preferences. However, you often delete emails that you want to read but
do not want to keep in your email box. This can be misinterpreted by the spam
filter’s AI and it can start filtering these important messages for you.
4 No System Can Be 100% Safe
Generally speaking, formal methods strive to build software right (and thus, reliable)
by eliminating flaws, e.g., requirements flaws. Formal method tools allow compre-
hensive analysis of requirements and design and eventually near-to-complete explo-
ration of system behavior, including fault conditions. However, good requirements
formalization depends mainly on the analytical skills of the requirements engineers
along with the proper use of the formal methods in hand. Hence, errors can be in-
troduced when capturing or implementing safety requirements. This is maybe the
main reason why, although efficient in terms of capacity of the dedicated analysis
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tools such as theorem provers and model checkers, formal methods actually do not
eliminate the need of testing.
In regards with safety requirements, the application of formal methods can only
add on safety. Even if we assume that proper testing can capture all the safety flaws
that we may capture with formal verification, with proper use of formal methods
we can always improve the quality of requirements and eventually derive more ef-
ficient test cases. Moreover, formal methods can be used to create formal specifi-
cations, which subsequently can be used for automatic test case generation. Hence,
in exchange for the extra work put to formally specify the safety requirements of
a system, you get not only the possibility to formally verify and validate these re-
quirements, but also to more efficiently test their implementation.
It is evident that 100% safety cannot be guaranteed, but when properly used,
formal methods can significantly contribute to safety by not replacing, but comple-
menting testing. The quantitative measure of how much safety can be gained with
formal methods may be regarded in three aspects:
1. Formal verification and validation allows for early detection of safety flaws, i.e.,
before implementation.
2. High quality of safety requirements improves the design and implementation of
these requirements.
3. Formally specified safety requirements assist in the derivation and generation
of efficient test cases.
To be more specific, although it really depends on the complexity of the system
in question, my intuition is that these three aspects complement each other and
together they may help us build a system with up to 99% safety guarantee. This
principle can be eventually applied to improve safety in AI by emphasizing its abil-
ity to autonomously tackle various hazards. Of course, this excludes the AI that is
elevated to the technological singularity level (see Section 3). For such AI, some
form of formal validation of “desired” technological singularity will help with the
safety guarantee. Eventually, some sort of analysis and formal framing of the sys-
tem’s artificial awareness can help with the validation of “desired” technological
singularity.
5 What can be Formalized?
Contemporary formal verification techniques (e.g., model checking [2]) rely on
state-transition models where objects or entities are specified with states they can
be in and associated with functions that are performed to change states or object
characteristics. Therefore, basically every system property that can be measured
or quantified, or qualified as a function can be formalized for the needs of formal
verification. Usually, the traditional types of requirements – functional and non-
functional (e.g., data requirements, quality requirements, time constraints, etc.), are
used to provide a specific description of functions and characteristics that address
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the general purpose of the system. The formal verification techniques use the formal
specification of such requirements to check desired safety and liveness properties.
For example, to specify safety properties of a system, we need to formalize “noth-
ing bad will happen to the system”, which can be done via the formalization of
non-desirable system states along with the formalization of behavior that will never
lead the system to these states.
Obviously, the formalization of well-defined properties (e.g., with proper states
expressed via boundaries, data range, outputs, etc.) is a straightforward task [19].
However, it is not that easy to formalize uncertainty, e.g., liveness properties (some-
thing good will eventually happen). Although, probabilistic theories such as the
classical and quantum theories, help us formalize “degrees of truth” and deal with
approximate conclusions rather with exact ones, the verification tools for fuzzy con-
trol systems are not efficient due to the huge state-explosion problem [2]. Moreover,
testing such systems is not efficient as well, simply because, statistical evidence
for their correct behavior may be not enough. Hence, any property that requires a
progressive evaluation (or partial satisfaction, e.g., soft goals) is difficult and often
impossible to be formalized for use in formally verified systems.
Other properties that are “intuitively desirable” (especially by AI) but still cannot
be formalized today are human behavior and principles, related to cultural differ-
ences, ethics, feelings, etc. The problem is that with the formal approaches today
we cannot express, for example, emotional bias as a meaningful system state.
6 Safe Self-driving Car Example
The example presented here should be regarded with the insight that “100% safety
is not possible”, especially when the system in question (e.g., a self-driving car)
engages in interaction with a non-deterministic and open-world environment [19]
(see Figure 1). What we should do though, to maximize the safety guarantee that
“the car would never injure a pedestrian” is to determine all the critical situations
involving the car itself in close proximity to pedestrians. Then we shall formalize
these situations as system and environment states and formalize self-adaptive be-
havior (e.g., as self-* objectives [13, 14]) driving the car in such situations [14, 15].
For example, a situation could be defined as “all the car’s systems are in operational
condition and the car is passing by a school”. To increase safety in this situation, we
may formalize a self-adaptive behavior such as “automatically decrease the speed
down to 20 mph when getting in close proximity to children or a school”.
Further, we need to specify situations involving close proximity to pedestrians
(e.g., crossing pedestrians) and car states emphasizing damages or malfunction of
the driving system, e.g., flat tires, malfunctioning steering wheel, malfunctioning
brakes, etc. For example, we may specify a self-adaptive behavior “automatically
turn off the engine when the brake system is malfunctioning and the car is getting
in close proximity to pedestrians”.
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Fig. 1 Self-driving Car Interacts with the Environment [7]
Other important situations should involve severe weather conditions introducing
hazards on the road, e.g., snow storm, ice, low visibility (formalized as environment
states), and the car getting in close proximity to pedestrians. In such situations,
formalized self-adaptive behavior should automatically enforce low speed, turning
lights on, turning wipers on, etc.
In this example, the self-* objectives shall be driven by an AI reasoner, so differ-
ent situations will be recognized and handled by an appropriate behavior.
7 Deductive Guarantees and Probabilistic Guarantees
Many of the deductive proofs for safety properties in today’s formally verified sys-
tems are already “probabilistic” in the sense that the designers have some subjective
uncertainty as to whether the formal specification accurately captures the intuitively
desirable safety properties, and (less likely) whether there was an error in the proof
somewhere.
With deductive guarantees [11] a formal verification actually provides true state-
ments that demonstrate that desired safety properties are held. Such a verification
process is deterministic and a complete proof is required to guarantee the correctness
of safety properties. For example, such a proof can be equipped with deterministic
rules and expressed in the classical first-order logic (or in high-order logic if we use
Isabelle to run a deductive verification). On the other hand, with the probabilistic
guarantees we can accept that a complete proof is not necessary and safety prop-
erties can be verified with some degree of uncertainty. Basically, the probabilistic
guarantees can be regarded as a result of quantification of uncertainty in both the
verification parameters and subsequent predictions. With the Bayesian methods [3],
for example, we quantify our uncertainty as prior distribution of our beliefs we have
in the values of certain properties. Moreover, we also embed likelihood in the prop-
erties formalization, i.e., how likely is it that we would observe a certain value in
particular conditions. You may think about it as the likelihood of holding certain
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safety properties in specific situations. Then, the probabilistic guarantees assert in a
natural way “likely” properties over the possibilities that we envision.
Unfortunately, deductive guarantees can be provided only for simple safety prop-
erties, because their complete proof often unavoidably does not terminate. Although
deductive verification may deal with infinite state systems, its automation is limited,
which is mainly due to the decidability of the logical reasoning (first-order logic
and its extensions such as high-order logic are not decidable, or they are rather
semi-decidable [8]). If we go back to our example with the self-driving car (see
Section 6), we may supply all the needed deterministic rules expressing our safety
requirements (e.g., speed limit of 20 mph when passing by a school), but the com-
plete proof eventually cannot be achieved, because although the desired conclusion
follows from some of the premises, other premises may eventually lead to resolution
refutation. That’s it, two sets of premises may lead to different proof results.
The probabilistic guarantees [2] are not as complete as the deductive ones, but
they may deal with more complex properties, e.g., where a larger number of states
can be required. Of course, this tradeoff should be considered when evaluating the
results of any probabilistic formal verification. So, if we ask ourselves how much
confidence in system’s safety is gained with formal methods, probabilistic guar-
antees bring less confidence than deductive ones, but they may bring some extra
confidence to safety properties that cannot be handled otherwise.
It is important to mention that abstraction [4] is the most efficient solution to the
state-explosion problem (and respectively, to the problem of deductive guarantees
decidability). With abstraction the size of the state space is reduced by aggregat-
ing state transitions into coarser-grained state transitions. The technique effectively
reduces the total amount of states to be considered but is likely to reduce the granu-
larity of the system to a point where it no longer adequately represents that system.
The problem is that although the abstract model (e.g, the formalization of safety
properties) is relatively small it should also be precise enough to adequately repre-
sent the original system.
Therefore, in order to obtain better results, we shall consider both verification ap-
proaches and eventually apply these together. For example, we may formalize with
the presumption that both deductive and probabilistic guarantees can be obtained in
a sort of compositional verification where we may apply both approaches to differ-
ent safety properties, and eventually combine the results under the characteristics of
global safety invariants. Such invariants can be classified as: goal invariants, behav-
ior invariants, interaction invariants and resource invariants [10].
8 Improving our Current Verification Toolset
Maybe the most popular technique for formal verification is model checking [2]
where the properties are expressed in a temporal logic and the system formalization
is turned into a state machine. The model checking methods verify if the desired
properties hold in all the reachable states of a system, which is basically a proof
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that properties will hold during the execution of that system. State explosion is the
main issue model checking is facing today. This problem is getting even bigger
when it comes to concurrent systems where the number of states is exponential to
the number of concurrent processes. So, basically, model checking is an efficient
and powerful verification method, but only when applied to finite, yet small state
spaces.
Here, to improve the current verification toolset, on the one side we need to work
on fully automated deductive verification based on decidable logics with both tem-
poral and probabilistic features, and on the other side we need to work on improv-
ing the model checking ability to handle large state spaces (e.g., symbolic model-
checking [9], probabilistic model checking [2], etc.).
Important work that seems neglected by the scientific community is the stabi-
lization science, which provides a common approach to studying system stability
through stability analysis [1, 6, 20]. In this approach, a system is linearized around
its operating point to determine a small-signal linearized model of that operating
point. The stability of the system is then determined using linear system stability
analysis methods such as Routh-Hurwitz, Root Locus, Bode Plot, and Nyquist Cri-
terion.
Stability analysis is the theory of validating the existence of stable states pre-
sented through differential equations that govern the system dynamics. Although,
theoretically, there is no guarantee for the existence of a solution to an arbitrary
set of nonlinear differential equations [5], we may use stabilization science to build
small-signal linearized models for the different system components, anticipating
that the linearized models of system components will yield a relatively small state
space, enabling for their efficient verification [10]. Then we may apply composi-
tional verification techniques to produce an overall system-wide verification.
Other, not that well-developed verification techniques are those related to au-
tomatic test-case generation and simulation [16], which may reduce testing costs
and improve the quality of testing. For example, test cases can be generated from
a formal specification of a system built with a domain-specific formal language. If
combined with code generation and analysis techniques for efficient test-case gen-
eration (e.g., change-impact analysis), automatic test-case generation might be used
to efficiently test system behavior under simulated conditions [16].
Moreover, high-performance computing can be used for parallelizing simula-
tions, which will allow multiple state space explorations to occur simultaneously.
9 Conclusion
Any AI system is a subject to uncertainty due to potential evolution in execution en-
vironment, in requirements, business conditions, available technology, and the like.
Thus, it is important to capture and plan for uncertainty as part of the development
process. Failure to do so may result in systems that are overly rigid for their pur-
pose, an eventuality of particular concern for domains that typically use AI, such
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as unmanned space flight. Contemporary formal verification techniques can be very
helpful in verifying safety properties via the formalization of non-desirable system
states along with the formalization of behavior that will never lead the system to
these states. Although complete safety is obviously not possible, the use of both de-
ductive and probabilistic guarantees may eventually help us cover a wide range of
the uncertainty in the AI systems’ behavior. The current verification toolset is not
powerful enough to guarantee safety in the complex AI behavior. Further enhance-
ment of that toolset can be achieved by developing better automated reasoning and
model checking, along with development of new verification techniques based on
stabilization science, test-case generation and simulation. High-performance com-
puting can be used for parallelization of the verification process.
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